

Mag. Agnes Zauner  
GLOBAL 2000 – Friends of the Earth Austria  
Neustiftgasse 36  
1070 Wien  
Österreich

<b>Your ref.</b> Email/ October 19, 2022	<b>Our ref.</b> 8090/2022	<b>Attended to by/contact</b> Mgr. Miriam Vachová +421 2 5822 1138	<b>Bratislava</b> October 27, 2022
---	------------------------------	--	---------------------------------------

**RE: GLOBAL 2000 Freedom of Information Request under act no. 211/2000 regarding Mochovce Nuclear Plant**

Dear Mag. Zauner,

We refer to your request for information, delivered to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (ÚJD SR), as a liable person according to § 2 par. 1 of Act No. 211/2000 Coll. on Free Access to Information and on Amendments to Certain Acts (Freedom of Information Act), as amended, on October 19, 2022.

Following your request, ÚJD SR as a liable person hereby according to § 18 par. 1 of the Freedom of Information Act provides you with the following information, which will be sent electronically to email address [robert.schwarzwald@global2000.at](mailto:robert.schwarzwald@global2000.at).

Requested information:

**Question 1 regarding acts of sabotage at Mochovce Nuclear plant project**

- a) Is it correct that there have been acts of sabotage at the Mochovce Nuclear plant Unit 3 project?*
- b) Is it correct that there have been acts of sabotage at the Mochovce Nuclear plant Unit 4 project?*
- c) If a) and b) are the case, in what areas of the project did these acts of sabotage occur, on what systems or technical components, and on which precise date(s)?*
- d) Is it correct that there have been cases of damaged or completely cut-through signal and electrical cables at the Mochovce Nuclear plant Unit 3 project in the years 2021 and 2022?*
- e) If d) is the case, in what areas of the project did these acts of sabotage occur, on what cables, and on which precise date(s)?*
- f) What measures does the Nuclear Regulator ÚJD plan to take in order to ascertain that there are no so far undetected acts of sabotage at the Mochovce Nuclear plant Unit 3 project?*
- g) What measures does the Nuclear Regulator ÚJD plan to take in order to ensure that sabotage at the Mochovce Nuclear plant Unit 3 and Unit 4 project does not reoccur?*

**ÚJD SR response:**

**a) No, it is not correct. ÚJD SR does not have any information about acts of sabotage at Unit 3 of Mochovce NPP (MO3).**

**b) No, it is not correct. ÚJD SR does not have any information about acts of sabotage at Unit 4 of Mochovce NPP (MO4).**

**c) Irrelevant, see the answers at a) and b).**

**d) Yes, that is correct. The licensee holder had found certain number of damaged cables and also cables that had been completely cut through. All these cables were duly reported through CAPA (Corrective and Preventive Actions) System as findings. All findings have been solved according to internal procedure.**

**e) Irrelevant, see the answers at a) and b).**

**f) Physical protection of the plant is responsibility of the license holder. At the Mochovce NPP Unit 3, there is fully functioned Physical Protection System, which is designed in full accordance with Atomic Act and Decree No. 51/2006 Coll. laying Down Details of Requirements for Provisions of Physical Protection and IAEA recommendations. In the Slovak Republic (SR) regularly meets expert group "Threat"(ÚJD SR, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Intelligent services, etc.), which re-evaluates threats in connection with the provision of physical protection, cyber security, operative resolution of situations resulting from events either in the SR or abroad, which have an impact on the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear installations. Until today, there hasn't been registered any sabotage (defined in Atomic Act) at NPPs in the SR.**

**g) ÚJD SR does not have any information about sabotage occurred at any NPPs in the SR. Measures against sabotage are projected in Physical Protection System of Nuclear Installations, and reflect the conclusions taken by the group "Threat" and intelligence services.**

**Question 2 regarding intentionally made inferior welds on austenitic pipelines in the Mochovce Nuclear Plant project**

*a) What is the final scope of the investigation of the welds on austenitic pipelines in phases 1 and 2 and the final total number of welds on austenitic pipelines inspected or to be inspected by the end of phase 2 in Unit 3?*

*b) If the final scope of the investigation of the welds on austenitic pipelines in phases 1 and 2 in Unit 3 does not encompass a full investigation of all welds of safety class I (BT I), safety class II (BT II) and safety class III (BT III), why is this the case and how can ÚJD guarantee that there are no intentionally made inferior welds on austenitic pipelines in the Mochovce Nuclear Plant project Unit 3 remaining?*

*c) What is the final scope of the investigation of the welds on austenitic pipelines in phases 1 and 2 and the total number of welds inspected in Unit 4?*

*d) If the final scope of the investigation of the welds on austenitic pipelines in phases 1 and 2 in Unit 4 does not encompass a full investigation of all welds of safety class I (BT I), safety class II (BT II) and safety class III (BT III), why is this the case and how can ÚJD guarantee that there are no intentionally made inferior welds on austenitic pipelines in the Mochovce Nuclear Plant project Unit 4 remaining?*

*e) Is 76 still the total number of non-conforming welds on austenitic pipelines that has been discovered in Mochovce Unit 3 during phase 1 and phase 2 of the investigation? If not, what is the total number of non-conforming welds discovered in Mochovce Unit 3?*

*f) What is the total number of non-conforming welds on austenitic pipelines that has been discovered in Mochovce Unit 4 during phase 1 and phase 2 of the investigation?*

*g) What is the reason for the current “random” inspection of welds on austenitic pipelines in Mochovce Units 1 and 2 rather than a full investigation of all welds of safety class I (BT I), safety class II (BT II) and safety class III (BT III) in EMO 12? By when will a full investigation of welds on austenitic pipelines of safety class I (BT I), safety class II (BT II) and safety class III (BT III) in EMO 12 be performed?*

**ÚJD SR Response:**

**a) Phase 01 has been completed. Total 6755 welds have been checked, 76 non-complaint (NOK) welds identified. Phase 02 is ongoing. During this phase additional 200 welds above 9mm will be checked. Completion of phase 02 is expected by end of 2022.**

**b) All suspicious welds (closure welds) and all welds from toxic welders have been verified. All NOK welds have been replaced with new ones, except 3 that have been left on non-classified systems for monitoring purposes (Note: originally was decided to leave 5 NOK welds, but after reconsideration 2 of them were already replaced). Regarding BT I welds, no finding was identified.**

**In parallel to measurements of welds, licensee has established complex risk assessment program in order to verify mechanical integrity and corrosion resistance of NOK welds. There was series of tests, analyses, consultations with external research institutes, universities and experts and mechanical calculations with postulated defects (most conservative scenarios). Based on all results from phase 01, licensee had confirmed safe and reliable operation of the plant in coming years even if some NOK welds would be still present; and ÚJD SR has accepted this confirmation.**

**Phase 02 (analyses and tests) aims:**

- to confirm safe and reliable operation from long-term aspect
- to schedule measurements of welds according to test results during outages.

**At the end of the whole verification campaign, the program for weld testing completion during outages of the MO3 will be defined.**

**c) At MO3 almost 7000 welds have been tested. The testing at MO3 will continue during outage period based on the results of second stage.**

**At MO4, 100% of all classified welds will be tested + all non-classified welds of toxic welders. This represents around 32 000 welds on MO4.**

**d) As stated above, at MO4, 100% of all classified welds will be tested + all non-classified welds of toxic welders. This represents around 32 000 welds at MO4.**

**e) 76 NOK welds up to 9mm have been identified during phase 01. In addition, during phase 02, additional 19 NOK welds above 9mm wall thickness have been identified.**

**f) Phase 01 and phase 02 only apply to MO3. At MO4, complete 100% testing of classified welds is ongoing. The results will be communicated at the end of testing campaign that is expected to be finalized in first half of 2023.**

**g) The testing approach for plants in operation is as follows: Based on MO34 testing results, the list of toxic welders is regularly communicated to operating plants MO12 and EBO V2. After that, there is check if those toxic welders have performed any welding work on operating plant. If yes, all the welds performed by toxic welders will be tested during outage period.**

**Question 3 regarding intentionally made inferior welds on austenitic pipelines in the Mochovce Nuclear Plant project**

*a) Is it correct that the cases of non-conforming welds on austenitic pipelines identified during phases 1 and 2 of the investigation show corrosion damage similar to the one portrayed in the internal briefing paper “MO34 Project Weekly Theme, Week No. 38”?*

*b) If a) is the case, is your statement still correct “that use of non-alloyed additive material with a low carbon content should not in any way significantly increase the risk of corrosion above the level usual for standard weld joints made with use of austenitic additional material”? If so, what is the corrosion level usual for standard weld joints made with use of austenitic additional material?*

*c) Is it correct that cases of corrosion damage in pipelines caused welds in Unit 3 to leak, even if this was unrelated to the current investigation of intentionally made inferior welds on austenitic pipelines?*

*d) If c) is the case, how many of such leaks have occurred, on what pipelines of what safety class, in what precise location(s) and on which precise date(s)?*

**ÚJD SR Response:**

**a) The Weekly Theme aims to educate all employees of the project about the topic of non-complaint welds and about the method to identify them by non-destructive way. Based on licensee statement, the picture used in booklet demonstrates representative case.**

**b) This aspect has been deeply studied and consulted with external expert companies during MO3 verification campaign. The corrosion level usual for standard weld joints made with use of austenitic additional material is negligible (0.01 mm/year).**

**c) All events, where some leakage has been identified, have been managed via non-conformity process in MO34 project and have no connection to the topic of NOK welds.**

**d) Irrelevant, see the answer c).**

Yours sincerely,

Mgr. Miriam Vachová, m. p.  
Director of Chancellery